The Great Pension Scandal: A Moral Fable
Let’s listen into the dialogue between an employer (E) and a new employee (N) somewhere in North America, sometime after the Second World War.
E: Great, you will be starting work with us on Monday.
N: Yes, I’m looking forward to it.
E: OK. We’ve got your benefits out of the way but now we have to think about your pension. Here is the deal. You put in 5% of your salary. We will match it. Because we know that people are too busy to do a very good job of managing their pension investments, we will put these funds into the company pension plan for you and we will manage it. That way you can be sure that what you need will be there for you when you retire.
N: Let me see if I understand this correctly. Instead of giving me 10% more in salary, you are going to hold it back. In effect, you’re paying me 10% less than you would have. Instead, you’ll invest this in a pension plan program for me, so that I’ll have a clearly defined set of pension benefits when I retire.
E: You’ve got it. Although we don’t think of it as deferred income. Instead, we think of it as the company putting company funds into your pension plan. We know that we are really better at managing long-term investment plans than individuals. Therefore, we just think of this as another company asset that we are managing for you in the long run.
N: OK. If that’s what it takes to get the job, I’ll go along.
Shared “Myths” and “Social Contract” Behind Pensions
This dialogue sets out the pension component of the employment contract that generations of employees have entered into since the Second World War. Broadly accepted by employers, employees, and politicians, these employment contracts really became a “social contract” that shaped the lives of millions of individuals and families. When it worked, it provided financial stability in the later years. When it didn’t, it created hardship for individuals and families.
The word “scandal” reflects the fact that this social contract is logically based on the idea of “personal income”. No matter how you try to make this situation “nice” or “legal”, the reality is that pension plan contributions are income that was paid to employees. The whole legal debate about who owes the “surplus” in pension plans that occurred in the 1990’s completely missed this fact. Pension plans contributions were and are listed as “deductions” from individual income in most organizations. The legalities of the various pension plan contracts crafted by organizations cannot escape this fundamental fact. Legal niceties have often hidden such fundamental moral realities in the endless arguments framed by careful and thoughtful lawyers who are paid to favor one side over another.
Unfortunately, these employment contracts, and the resulting social contract that evolved from them, are based on a number of commonly accepted beliefs that have not held up over time.
- Individuals were taking “life long” jobs. Careers progressed within the boundaries of a single-employer. People would retire from the first (or at least, an early) employer they joined in their careers. In many cases, they did. This employment pattern started to break down in the last decades of the 20th century.
- Organizations last a “long time” – over 50 years. Unfortunately, as research has shown, most public and private corporations simply do not have life spans that last this long.Many of the largest corporations in the Fortune 2000 simply disappear as visible entities. In fact, the only employer with some guarantee of this kind of life span tends to to be the government.
- Organizations are led by individuals who have a sense of responsibility for the welfare of their employees.This “paternalistic” mindset became less and less common as the decades since the Second Work War progressed. It was associated with a form of “male”: and “employee” chauvinism that has been undermined by the social movements of unionism, feminism, and anti-racism.
- Most individuals are not capable of managing their financial affairs in a way that ensures that they will save for the “later years”. The complexities of investment and the stock market require special expertise and ability. An organization’s leaders are more capable of identifying this kind of expertise than the average individual. Therefore, it made sense for the organization to “own” the pension assets, and manage investments for employees.
- Defined benefit plans made long-term sense. Shortfalls from investments will always be made up by the future contributions of future employees. Somehow, their numbers would always be large enough, and the investment wisdom of pension plan managers would always be great enough, to support defined benefit pension plans 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 years into the future.
Unrealistic Beliefs
Today, we know that these beliefs were really a form of social elitism. This social elitism still exists today, even in the face of events that have shown its shortcomings. The upper cadre in organizations still believes that they were more capable than the majority of their employees to make long-term decisions. Specialized “pension managers” still believe that they are more capable of investing pension income and ensuring that adequate amounts would be available to pay out defined benefit pensions to individuals 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 years into the future.
Throughout the second half of the 20th Century, the political elite, closely connected to the organizational elite, shared these beliefs. They created legal frameworks governing pensions that treated pension funds as assets of organizations. Deferred income belonging to employees became regarded as an asset on an organization’s balance sheet.
During the later decades of the 20th century, as government started to realize that there was a “pension” problem, and used tax-based incentives to encourage individuals to “save” additional funds through RRSPs (Canada) and 401K plans (US), these beliefs shaped the legislation which regulated private pension plan industry as well.
When organizations face financial difficulties, pension assets, just like any other asset on the balance sheet, are used to “deal” with the claims of the organization’s creditors. Pensioners are the creditors of last resort. All other creditors have a prior claim to the organization’s assets. Somehow, the fact that pension funds were really deferred income that logically belonged to the employees got lost in the social elite’s paternalistic approach to pension plan management. Corporations set up to manage “additional” savings (e.g. RRSP or 401K) savings are treated in the same way. Other creditors come first when they run into financial difficulty.
Government-based pension plans were created as a pension of “last resort” to cover these gaps. Unfortunately, the managers of these government plans also believed in their ability to predict long-term financial trends. Time has made abundantly clear that all pension managers’ – corporate and government – belief in their own abilities substantially over-estimate their actual long-term financial and investment management performance. Government pension plans, both for government employees and for other members of society, are also facing a severe underfunding crisis.
The beliefs of the social and political elite that underlie pension plan management were and are unrealistic. They reflect an “over optimistic” view of “themselves” shared by the organizational and political elite in society. Pension benefits for current and former employees / contributors have disappeared, and will continue to disappear, within a pension regulatory regime based on these beliefs.
An Impending Pension Disaster
At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, dialogue about an impending pension plan disaster fueled both political debate and pundit commentary. However, very little of this commentary looks back to the social conditions which created the crisis. Few of the reforms proposed address the underlying moral scandal that led to crisis. This scandal, and the proposed attempts to mitigate it, continues to refuse to recognize a number of simple fundamental truths.
1. Pension assets do not belong to the organizations that manage them, whether they are private corporations or specialty organizations created to manage these funds. They belong to the individuals whose deferred income or chosen contributions fund them. This deferred income and chosen contributions, and the return, good or bad on the investment of these funds, make up the assets of all pension funds. Pension fund managers are stewards of others’ assets. They have no “right” to these assets.
2. Pension assets belong to individuals as individuals, not to the the collective group who, at any point in time, might be entitled to benefits from a pension plan. Organizations which offer pension plan saving services today recognize this. Individuals can choose to place some part of their income in such plans. Logically, such individual choices are no different from the implicit choice individuals make to place some part of their income into a pension plan on accepting an offer of employment.
3. Pension plan managers, whether working for an organization that employs individuals or for an organization offering a pension plan management service to individuals, are stewards of others’ assets. As a result, they cannot claim any right of confidentiality with respect to their activities as they steward those assets. Freedom of information about their activities – all of their activities – is simply a right which goes with the fact that individuals own the assets in a pension plan. The idea that such stewardship groups or organizations are somehow like private corporations, and entitled to privacy about their internal activities, simply does not hold.
4. Management teams make decisions that balance between the very short and the foreseeable future. Generally, this means that they make decisions which choose between immediate benefits (this year and next) and benefits attainable in the foreseeable future (3 to 5 years).
Pension plans require that individuals look 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 years ahead. That is almost impossible, given the nature of human ability. Very few people can accurately see what will happen in our global society 50 years ahead. Those that do tend to focus on broad trends, e.g. the environment. They do not often make judgments about specific investment choices that need to generate a return adequate to fund pension obligations 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 years into the future. Consequently, pension managers need to be responsive to a form of governance which is very different from that applied to either profit or not-for-profit corporations.
Corrective Responsibilities and Actions
Today, we as a society have to deal with the results of our past actions. We cannot escape the fact that our shared beliefs, and the natural collusion between organizational and political elites, created a current problem. We can also not avoid moral components of our current pension dilemma. The corrective action must go back to basics. Saving for pensions is done out of the income of individuals. Consequently, they own the those savings, and the results that come about from the management of those savings, no matter who does this.
Fixing the current pension problem will not be easy. It will take careful thought and open dialogue at all levels of our society. It will will need to go beyond the ideas that follow. However, we must start. Tinkering with the existing pension plan system will not work. We must address some of the fundamental underlying beliefs that created this crisis in the first place.
1. Politicians must immediately pass legislation that recognizes that pensions belong to individuals not to organizations, whether they are employers or pension savings service management corporations offering to manage pension related savings.
Consequences:
Pensions become “creditor” of first resort, not last resort when these organizations fail financially.
The pension savings management industry will develop ways to facilitate the “movement” of individuals’ pensions as they compete for this service business.
Organizations doing business with pension savings management companies, recognizing that they will be “creditors” of last resort, will rapidly “sharpen” their evaluation of these firms and only do business with the ones most likely to last and survive.
Financial corporations (e.g. banks and insurance companies) offering “pension savings management” services will need to take steps to “isolate” this part of their business from the other “financial risks” that apply to their balance sheets.
Employing organizations that manage “company pension plans” will take steps to “isolate” these assets from the other parts of their business.
All of the internal information created by these pension management service firms will be “publicly” available, since the companies doing this service are “stewards”, not owners of anything. This will “speed” up the spread of best practices in the industry, and reward the “best stewards”.
Over time, individuals will be able to migrate their pension savings to the “best performing” pension savings management organizations.
2. Politicians must create a regulatory scheme for pension savings management organizations that focuses on “adequacy” to meet future obligations, not past’s year’s return on investment.
Consequences:
Pension management service groups, even if they exist within the framework of employing organizations, must be structured as “not-for-profit” organizations that are accountable to the individuals who ultimately own the funds which fuel them. That does not mean that pension plan managers cannot earn “individual incomes” based on their activity. It does mean that such managers cannot use the “structure” of private or public corporations, or the laws relating to them, to reduce their fundamental need to be accountable to the owners of these funds. It also means that they cannot use existing corporate law to reduce their need to be totally transparent in their activities to such owners.
Pension savings management firms will need to develop complex predictive models that relate their funds under management to the “payouts” they expect to make to their funders 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 years in the future. These models will need to take into account the “age distribution” of their funders, as well as their understanding of the likely investment performance of their funds under management. The year-over-year success or failure of their predictions will become the basis of their “competition” for contributors’ funds, not backward looking past investment histories. This has two profound implications. First, long-term investment strategists will be attracted to such firms. Second, over time, better and better prediction models will be developed, which will help regulate this industry in its true time frame (10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 years into the future).
The government regulatory agency, which oversees this industry, will have to develop “extraordinary skill” at this kind of predictive modeling. It will be able to do so, based on the fact, that the internal details of these models will be publicly available.
3. Politicians must pass legislation that requires individuals who earn above a certain income level annually (say 50% of the national average) to contribute a minimum part of their income (say 10%) to a pension savings management organization.
Consequences:
Working out the details of how to do this, and how to move the funds from employers to these organizations, will require careful thought. Surely, a society capable of the electronic banking and fund management we have today can find ways of doing this effectively.
Individuals can always save more if they chose to do so.
4. No pension income that is less that the average annual income in a society should be subject to income tax.
People made their income-based contribution to society during their earning years. Once they are living off “pension” income, whether they receive it from the government, or a pension income management organization, a certain portion of it should be sheltered from income tax.
Consequences:
People living on “minimum” pensions today would receive an immediate boast in “income”.
When combined with other social support mechanisms, e.g. income supplement for the “poorest” seniors, society will deal responsibly with the problems created by the “myths” underlying pension management in the past.
Being Part of a Society is Making Moral Choices
Pension savings dynamics and schemes are part of the social framework that makes up modern society. Like all the components of such frameworks, they are not “true” or “factual” in the same way as facts about the material world. They are part of the way that we build “ways” of being together in “society”. As such, they have moral and ethical components which cannot escape logical argument and reasoned debate. They need constant review in the light of changing social dynamics. They also need open dialogue through which each person in a democratic society has the right to make themselves heard.